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Abstract 
We examine if, and under what conditions, disclosure of sustainability information identified as investor 
relevant by market-driven innovations in accounting standard-setting, is associated with stock prices 
reflecting more firm-specific information and thereby lower synchronicity with market and industry returns. 
We find that firms voluntarily disclosing more sustainability information, identified as material by the 
Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB), have lower stock price synchronicity. This result is 
stronger for firms with higher exposure to sustainability issues, institutional and socially responsible 
investment fund ownership and coverage from analysts with less firm-specific experience and lower 
portfolio complexity. Moreover, we find intra-industry information transfers to firms with low 
sustainability disclosure within industries with high sustainability disclosure. We also document that 
sustainability information not identified by the accounting standard setting process is not associated with 
stock price synchronicity.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The number of companies disclosing and investors using sustainability information has grown 
exponentially over the past few years. While only a few companies disclosed such information in the early 
2000s, it has now become common practice for companies to communicate the relevance of such 
information for their business strategy and operations. However, in the United States, but also 
internationally, such disclosures are not yet guided by a set of accounting standards that define investor 
relevant disclosure requirements. This stands in contrast to financial reporting, which is largely driven by 
requirements set in financial accounting standards. The formation of financial accounting standards is 
considered an important element of the development of capital markets and the efficient allocation of capital 
in an economy (Levitt 1998; Healy and Palepu 2000) and a long line of research examines the effect of 
standards on economic outcomes (see for example, Barth, Landsman and Lang 2008; Naughton, Petacchi 
and Weber 2015; Bratten, Choudhary and Schipper 2013).  
Recent survey findings suggest that a large number of market participants consider the development 
of standards to account for firms’ environmental and social inputs and outcomes, such as energy and water 
consumption, employee and workplace practices, product safety, and access to affordable products for 
customers, is important, as these metrics constitute relevant information to understanding the risks and 
opportunities that an organization faces (Amel-Zadeh and Serafeim 2017). As a result, standards have 
emerged that companies can voluntarily adopt to disclose investor relevant sustainability information.  
While it is early to judge the potential market adoption of the standards and the effects on markets and 
organizations, publicly listed companies, such as JetBlue and Kilroy Realty, have decided to adopt the 
standards thereby generating a need for systematic research on the characteristics of the information 
identified in the standards. To address this void, we examine whether firms that voluntarily disclosed 
information later identified in the standards as investor relevant, exhibited lower stock price synchronicity, 
consistent with voluntary disclosure of sustainability information enabling the incorporation of firm-
specific information in stock prices. 
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 Our research setting is the accounting standards developed by the Sustainability Accounting 
Standards Board (SASB). SASB adopts an investor viewpoint and has identified sustainability metrics that 
are likely to be of relevance to investors. Large asset managers, such as BlackRock, Capital Group, and 
State Street, participate in the investor advisory group of SASB, while the board of directors comprise a 
group of individuals with deep accounting and capital markets expertise, including former accounting 
standards setters from the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and SEC commissioners. 
According to SASB, specific sustainability issues are more or less investment relevant depending on a 
company’s industry and, as a result, accounting standards are industry-specific. To construct a measure of 
material sustainability information for each firm, we create a disclosure score using Bloomberg data items 
that have been mapped to the SASB issues for each industry. Therefore, the data items that comprise the 
disclosure score are industry-specific and each firm scores according to its disclosure practices in relation 
to metrics deemed financially material for that industry.  
Our measure of firm-specific information in stock prices is the measure of stock price synchronicity 
that has been extensively used in prior research (Wurgler 2000; Durnev, Morck and Yeung 2004; Piotroski 
and Roulstone 2004; Crawford, Roulstone and So 2012). Using sustainability data between 2007 and 2014 
for a sample of 1,333 US-listed companies, we find a negative and significant association between our 
measure of material sustainability information and stock price synchronicity. This association is not 
mediated when we control for whether the firm issues a sustainability report. In addition, we find that the 
association between synchronicity and the presence of a sustainability report is insignificant. In additional 
analyses, we document that sustainability disclosures not identified by the standards and compliance with 
sustainability disclosure standards that do not cater to investors are also not correlated with stock price 
synchronicity. 
We find that the documented association between material sustainability information and stock 
price synchronicity is moderated by several variables. These moderating effects provide new insights into 
the firm and capital market characteristics that enable the incorporation of sustainability information in 
stock prices, while increasing our confidence that the sustainability information rather than a correlated 
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omitted variable drives the association with stock price synchronicity. Moreover, these results increase our 
confidence that in our setting, the stock price synchronicity measure reflects incorporation of firm-specific 
news rather than noise in stock prices (Li, Rajgopal, and Venkatachalam 2014). Two key sets of variables 
are included as moderators: firm characteristics and capital market participant characteristics.  
On the firm side, we expect the negative relation between stock price synchronicity and material 
sustainability information to be stronger for firms for which sustainability issues are more important. We 
construct two proxies for the importance of sustainability issues. The first is a measure of a company’s 
exposure to sustainability issues using data from Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI). While 
SASB defines sustainability issues that are material at the industry level, different companies within the 
same industry have varying degrees of exposure to the same issues. For example, an apparel company with 
a long supply chain in Bangladesh is more exposed to human rights issues compared to an apparel company 
with a supply chain in Canada. Similarly, a real estate company with properties in Miami Beach is more 
exposed to climate change and rising sea levels compared to a real estate company with properties in a non-
coastal US city. The second proxy is a measure from Thomson Reuters ASSET4 of the integration of 
sustainability issues in a company’s business strategy and operations. For example, while a consumer goods 
company might have made access to healthier products core to its business, transitioning their product 
portfolio away from unhealthy options and creating a strong brand around this issue, another consumer 
goods company might have introduced additional options for consumers while keeping a balanced portfolio. 
The former company develops a strong identification of the entire company and brand with the focal 
sustainability issues, while the latter does not. We find that both variables significantly moderate the 
association between sustainability information and stock price synchronicity.  
On the capital markets side, we expect that investors with higher information processing 
capabilities will be more effective at incorporating material sustainability information in stock prices. Our 
first measure is the percentage of institutional investors holding the outstanding shares of each company, 
as institutional investors are more likely to be able to process the valuation implications of new types of 
information, such as sustainability information, compared to retail investors. The second proxy is the 
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percentage of shares outstanding held by funds labeled as socially responsible. While these funds are not 
the only funds using sustainability information, their long history of using the information might increase 
their processing ability. We find that both measures significantly moderate the association between 
sustainability information and stock price synchronicity. We also document that firms covered by analysts 
with higher portfolio complexity (i.e. analysts that cover more firms) have a weaker association between 
sustainability information and stock price synchronicity. This is consistent with analysts that have higher 
processing costs, due to higher workload, being less capable of processing sustainability information. 
Finally, we find that firms covered by analysts with more firm-specific experience have a weaker 
association between sustainability information and stock price synchronicity. Although one might expect 
that more experienced analysts would be able to process sustainability information more effectively, our 
results suggest that lack of experience and disclosure could be complements in that more disclosure is 
needed for less experienced analysts to be able to process the information. 
We also examine the presence of intra-industry information transfers (Foster 1981; Gleason et al. 
2008) in the context of sustainability information. If information transfers exist, we expect that stock returns 
of firms that disclose little information about their material sustainability issues will exhibit higher co-
movement with industry returns, if they belong to an industry where companies’ disclosure levels are high. 
In contrast, we expect no effect on co-movements with industry returns for firms that disclose little 
information but belong to industries where on average companies’ disclosure levels are low. We measure 
the level of industry information in stock returns as the difference between the explanatory power of market 
and industry returns versus only market returns, following Piotroski and Roulstone (2004). The higher this 
difference, the more a firm’s stock returns contain industry-level information. We find strong evidence that, 
within the whole sample, firms with low sustainability disclosure exhibit high industry-level synchronicity, 
and that this result is driven only by firms in industries with rich information environments (i.e. above-
average industry level sustainability disclosure scores). 
We conduct a series of robustness tests to assess the validity of our results, including assessing the 
association between sustainability disclosures not identified by the accounting standards and synchronicity, 
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as well as controlling for earnings quality proxies. Moreover, following the recommendations of Li et al. 
(2014), we conduct additional analyses to examine whether the association with stock price synchronicity 
is indicative of news or noise in stock prices. Li et al. (2014) recommend controlling for beta in regressions 
that use stock price synchronicity as the dependent variable to assess whether the documented relation 
changes sign or disappears. In our case, we find that there is still a negative and significant association when 
controlling for both market and industry beta suggesting the association between sustainability disclosures 
and both synchronicity and idiosyncratic volatility yields consistent results.  
This study contributes to four different streams of literature. First, an emerging literature examines 
the development of accounting standards for disclosure of sustainability information (Khan, Serafeim and 
Yoon 2016). We build on this line of work to examine how firm disclosures around material sustainability 
issues are associated with firm-specific information being reflected in market prices. In contrast to Khan et 
al. (2016), we examine variation in firms’ disclosure practices rather than ratings of firms’ sustainability 
performance as our independent variable of interest.1 Disclosure and ratings of performance are different 
theoretical constructs, as data providers interpret a wide array of information to evaluate a company’s 
performance, but are also empirically distinct, as evidenced by their low (albeit positive) correlation.2 In 
addition, Khan et al. (2016) focus on implications for future market and accounting returns, whereas we 
focus on implications for the level of firm, industry and market information in stock prices. Our results 
suggest that firms with higher material sustainability disclosures have stock returns that exhibit lower co-
movement with market and industry returns, consistent with stock prices moving more because of firm-
specific information. 
Moreover, we theoretically motivate and empirically examine the conditions under which material 
sustainability disclosures are most effective in the price discovery process. We document that the 
                                                          
1 Khan et al. (2016) measure sustainability outcomes such as environmental performance (e.g. level and intensity of 
greenhouse gas emissions), social performance (e.g. employee satisfaction and human rights scandals) and governance 
performance (e.g. corruption charges), whereas we measure the level of sustainability disclosure (e.g. transparency 
around emissions, employment practices, human rights policies, and anti-corruption metrics). 
2 The correlation between our disclosure score and the performance rating used in Khan et al. (2016) is approximately 
0.1. Moreover, controlling for their rating in our models does not change any of our inferences.  
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association between return synchronicity and material sustainability disclosure is a function of a company’s 
competitive positioning and strategy as well as its ownership base, building on a literature that examines 
the role of strategy and ownership base on the association between voluntary disclosure and capital market 
outcomes (Healy and Palepu 2000; Bushee and Miller 2012). Relatedly, we contribute to a literature that 
documents the influence of sustainability disclosures and ratings on analyst recommendations (Ioannou and 
Serafeim 2015) and forecasts (Dhaliwal et al. 2012). We find that portfolio complexity and analyst 
experience moderate the relation between sustainability information and synchronicity, highlighting the 
role of sell-side analysts in intermediating the price discovery process. 
Our paper also contributes to a literature that seeks to understand innovations in accounting 
practices because of standards developed by market forces rather than regulatory forces (Allee and Yohn 
2009; Serafeim 2011). Our results build on this literature and suggest that market forces, in our case a focal 
NGO with the participation of companies, investors and information intermediaries, could develop 
accounting standards that reflect investor relevant firm-specific information, complementing the regulatory 
process through which financial accounting standards have been developed.  
Finally, our paper makes a contribution to a literature on intra-industry information transfers of 
regulated financial information. In contrast to the prior literature that examines intra-industry information 
transfers whereby an idiosyncratic event that affects the short-window stock price of one firm also affects 
the contemporaneous short-window stock price of another firm in the same industry (Foster, 1981; Gleason 
et al., 2008) or that documents cross-firm stock return predictability as a function of accounting quality 
(Chen et al. 2017) we document significantly higher industry-level synchronicity for firms that have low 
levels of  sustainability information disclosure but are members of industries with relatively high levels of 
sustainability information disclosure. 
2. MOTIVATION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
Reporting of sustainability information increased exponentially over the past two decades. The number of 
companies measuring and reporting environmental (i.e. carbon emissions, water consumption, waste 
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generation, etc.), social (i.e. employee, product, customer related, etc.), and governance (i.e. political 
lobbying, anticorruption, board diversity, etc.) data, collectively ESG data, grew significantly. While fewer 
than 20 companies disclosed ESG data in the early 1990s, the number of companies issuing sustainability 
or integrated reports had increased to nearly 9,000 by 2016.  
Investor interest in ESG data also grew rapidly. Signatories to the UN Principles for Responsible 
Investment (PRI), launched in 2006, commit to incorporate ESG issues into their investment analysis and 
ownership policies and practices. As of 2016, the principles had about 1,400 signatories with total assets 
under management of about $60 trillion.3 As a further sign of the institutionalization of ESG data, 
Bloomberg terminals integrated ESG data in 2010, dramatically increasing the diffusion of ESG 
information. As of 2016, more than 100 rating agencies provided ESG data, including large data providers 
such as Thomson Reuters and MSCI.  
With this increasing investor interest in ESG data, researchers began exploring its decision 
usefulness from an investment perspective (e.g. Dhaliwal et al. 2011; Cheng et al. 2014; Grewal et al. 
2017).4 Although an increasing number of investors have committed to incorporate ESG data in their 
investment decisions, investors view the lack of reporting standards for material sustainability information 
as the major impediment for using the data (Amel-Zadeh and Serafeim 2017). According to a recent study 
that surveyed senior investment professionals from organizations representing 43% of institutional assets 
under management, the lack of reporting standards for material sustainability information leads to a lack of 
comparability of reported information across firms and time, increases costs of gathering and analyzing 
ESG information, and increases the probability of general and boilerplate disclosures (Amel-Zadeh and 
Serafeim 2017). All these factors limit investors’ ability to use ESG information in investment decisions.  
                                                          
3 United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment, http://www.unpri.org/signatories/signatories/. 
4 These studies document that voluntary disclosure of ESG leads to a reduction in the firm’s cost of capital, while 
attracting dedicated institutional investors and analyst coverage (Dhaliwal et al. 2011); that firms with better ESG 
performance face significantly lower capital constraints (Cheng et al. 2014); and that stock price reactions to mandated 
ESG disclosure regulation vary predictably based on ex-ante ESG performance (Grewal et al. 2017). 
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To fill this reporting void, SASB has developed industry-specific reporting standards for financially 
material sustainability information. SASB uses the SEC definition of materiality as interpreted by the U.S. 
Supreme Court.5 The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) also refers to the U.S. 
Supreme Court interpretation of securities laws in its materiality guidance, which defines material 
information as presenting a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been 
viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the total mix of information made 
available. Like the PCAOB, SASB defines material information as information that represents a substantial 
likelihood that its disclosure will be viewed by the reasonable investor as significantly altering the total 
mix of information made available.  
Despite the objectives of SASB’s reporting standards, we lack evidence about whether the 
standards indeed provide investors with useful, firm-specific information, and whether investors integrate 
this information into their valuation of firms that disclose even prior to the development of the standards. 
Analogous to studies that examine how new accounting standards affect capital market outcomes (e.g. 
Beatty et al. 1996; Cornett et al. 1996; Dechow et al. 1996) as well as studies examining the value relevance 
of specific accounting line items over time (e.g. Collins et al. 1997; Francis and Shipper 1999; Barth et al. 
2017) we evaluate market-driven innovations in sustainability reporting, due to their possible influence on 
voluntary disclosure practices and standard setters. Specifically, there may be wide-spread market adoption 
of SASB across firms and, if the SEC were to mandate sustainability reporting, it could prescribe SASB 
standards. Moreover, prior research has documented the influence of political and professional 
characteristics of standard setters on accounting standards (e.g. Allen and Ramanna, 2012; Ramanna, 2008). 
Given the lengthy, negotiated and multi-stakeholder process that SASB standards evolved from – including 
the input and involvement of hundreds of companies – evaluating SASB standards is critical given the 
uncertainty surrounding whether SASB achieved its objective of developing metrics that provide value-
                                                          
5 TSC Industries v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). See also Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
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relevant firm-specific information, as opposed to being influenced by the objective functions of participants 
in the standard-setting process. 
We view the inquiry in this paper as a step towards understanding whether SASB standards could 
mitigate the impediments to the use of ESG data in investment decisions. In other words, if SASB standards 
do not capture value-relevant, firm-specific information that is incorporated in stock prices, it is unlikely 
that the standards will have a significant effect on the use of ESG information by investors. This is because 
even if SASB standards increase comparability, timeliness and specificity of the disclosed sustainability 
information in the future, this information will still lack relevance. Moreover, our tests allow us to assess 
whether capital markets incorporate this information before the development and release of standards that 
could raise the comparability, timeliness and specificity of information. Therefore, our results could provide 
a baseline for evaluating the effect of these standards on future disclosure and capital market outcomes.  
3. DATA AND SAMPLE 
3.1. Materiality Data 
Our data collection is driven by the availability of materiality guidance from SASB, which is an independent 
501(c)3 non-profit whose mission is to develop and disseminate sustainability accounting standards that 
help publicly-listed corporations disclose material factors in compliance with SEC requirements. SASB 
standards are designed for the disclosure of material sustainability issues in mandatory SEC filings, such 
as the Form 10-K and 20-F. SASB is accredited to establish sustainability accounting standards by the 
American National Standards Institute (ANSI), and such accreditation is intended to signify that SASB’s 
procedures to develop sustainability accounting standards meet the Institute’s requirements for openness, 
balance, consensus, and due process. SASB’s board comprises a mix of regulators, academics, lawyers, and 
investors, including two former Chairwomen of the SEC and a former Chairman of the FASB. 
SASB adopts an investor viewpoint and, as a result, a topic might be classified as immaterial from 
an investor standpoint although such a topic could be important for other stakeholders. The investor focus 
of SASB is different from that of other organizations such as the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), which 
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has a multi-stakeholder focus. In a joint op-ed, the Chief Executives of GRI and SASB explained how the 
two are complements rather than substitutes. They suggest that “rather than being in competition, GRI and 
SASB are designed to fulfill different purposes for different audiences… The GRI standards are designed 
to provide information to a wide variety of stakeholders and consequently, include a very broad array of 
topics. SASB’s are designed to provide information to investors and consequently, focus on the subset of 
sustainability issues that are financially material.”6  
SASB’s standards are developed via a multi-stakeholder process consisting of research supported 
by Bloomberg technology, data and analytical tools; balanced, multi-stakeholder industry working groups; 
a public comment period; and review by an independent Standards Council comprised of experts in 
standards development, securities law, environmental law, metrics and accounting.7 SASB convenes 
industry working groups—consisting of 1/3 corporations, 1/3 market participants, and 1/3 other 
stakeholders—to provide feedback on SASB’s draft sustainability accounting standards. More than 3,000 
experts representing more than $30 trillion in assets under management and $15 trillion in company market 
capitalization participated in SASB’s industry working groups between 2013 and 2016. Importantly, 
although the standards include a crowdsourcing of industry expert opinions, a scanning of regulated fillings 
for mentions of different sustainability issues and documentation of cases of impacts on revenues, costs, 
assets and liabilities, the standard setting process involves no large scale quantitative analysis. Thereby, 
there is a need for examining the characteristics of these standards and their association with market 
outcomes. 
3.2. Sustainability Data 
We retrieve data on sustainability disclosure practices from Bloomberg. Bloomberg is the leading source 
of corporate and financial data on public companies. Bloomberg tracks more than 300 different metrics, 
covering all aspects of ESG, from political donations to number of environmental spills.8 Bloomberg has 
                                                          
6 https://www.greenbiz.com/article/how-approach-corporate-sustainability-reporting-2017  
7 See www.sasb.org 
8 See Framework, Behind the Terminal: Understanding the Bloomberg ESG Numbers, www.framework-llc.co 
m/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Bloomberg-ESG-Infographic.pdf  
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recently integrated a transparent mapping of its ESG disclosure metrics to SASB reporting standards. Given 
that SASB standards differ across industries, we manually collected for each industry all Bloomberg ESG 
data items that were mapped to SASB topics. We then constructed disclosure scores by taking into account 
these industry-specific Bloomberg ESG data items.  
We compute the material SASB ESG disclosure score for each firm-year combination (MaterialDisc) 
as the ratio of number of disclosed SASB ESG metrics to total number of material metrics mandated by 
SASB and available in Bloomberg. We note that not all of SASB’s metrics have corresponding Bloomberg 
ESG metrics. For example, in the Automobiles industry, SASB has proposed “Average recyclability of 
vehicles sold, by weight” as a material sustainability metric, but Bloomberg does not collect data pertaining 
to this metric. Data coverage is different for different industries. This is by construction, as SASB standards 
are industry specific. For the different sectors, we document on average SASB data coverage of 80% for 
Renewables, 78% for Non-Renewables, 75% for Transportation, 61% for Consumption, 61% for Resource 
Transformation, 54% for Technology & Communications, 52% for Services, and 45% for Health Care. 
While incomplete coverage could create noise in our estimates thereby biasing them towards zero, it is not 
clear that it will introduce bias in a positive or negative direction. Our estimates are within a SICS industry 
and therefore differential data coverage across SICS industries should not affect our results. Moreover, it is 
unlikely that firms are disclosing a significant amount of SASB metrics that are not available in Bloomberg. 
Per our discussion with an ESG analyst at Bloomberg, the reason why Bloomberg does not collect data 
points for all of SASB’s metrics is because some SASB metrics constitute innovations in sustainability 
reporting and are not yet being disclosed by firms. Therefore, we view the relative scores of each company 
within its industry as a fairly accurate rating of its disclosure practices.9 We observe that the SASB metrics 
not covered by Bloomberg are more granular – but very similar in scope – as other SASB metrics that are 
covered by Bloomberg. For example, in Oil & Gas, “Gross global Scope 1 emissions” is a SASB metric 
                                                          
9 It could, however, be the case that only the SASB metrics available in Bloomberg are financially material, while the 
ones that are not available (and that firms do not disclose) are immaterial. This would mean that our inferences are 
not generalizable to all SASB disclosures. 
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covered by Bloomberg, while “Global Scope 1 emissions from (1) combustion, (2) flared hydrocarbons, 
(3) process emissions, (4) directly vented releases, and (4) fugitive emissions” is a SASB metric not covered 
by Bloomberg. Clearly, the second metric is much more detailed than the first, while they both relate to the 
same disclosure topic (greenhouse gas emissions) that is financially relevant in this industry.  
As SASB does not recommend weights for metrics within an industry, we adjust for double counting 
of metrics that fall into several topics. For example, within the SASB Sustainable Industry Classification 
System (SICS) industry “Containers and Packaging”, the metric “Human Rights Policy” belongs to two 
disclosure topics: “Security, Human Rights, and Rights of Indigenous Peoples” and “Community 
Relations”. For our total disclosure score, we only account for “Human Rights Policy” once. Our resulting 
sustainability disclosure ratio reflects material ESG disclosure according to SASB standards and can range 
from 0 to 100 percent.  
3.3. Measurement of Stock Return Synchronicity 
A growing literature in both accounting and finance examines the relation between firm-specific variation 
in stock returns and several aspects of the firm’s information or governance environment (e.g. Wurgler, 
2000; Durnev et al. 2004; Piotroski et al. 2004; Ferreira et al. 2011; Crawford et al. 2012). These studies 
proxy for the mix of firm-specific and industry- and market-wide information available about the firm using 
stock return synchronicity (measured as the R2 value from a regression of firm returns on market and 
industry returns) where lower R2 reflects stock prices with greater firm-specific information.  Therefore, in 
this paper, we assess whether firms that voluntarily disclose more information, as later prescribed by SASB 
standards, have lower stock price synchronicity.  
We compute stock return synchronicity consistent with previous literature (Roll 1988; Piotroski 
and Roulstone 2004; Crawford et al. 2012; Li et al. 2014). We collect daily firm stock returns, value-
weighted industry returns, and market returns for our sample from CRSP. We winsorize the returns at the 
1 and 99 level to remove potential outliers. Following Crawford et al. (2012) we require a minimum of 50 
daily observations. We exclude firm-year combinations that have less than 12 trading days for each month, 
as in Li et al. (2014). For each year, we then estimate firm-specific regressions using market and industry 
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returns. We extract the R2 from each of these regressions to compute firm-year synchronicity, defined as 
follows: 
𝑆𝑦𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑅2
1 − 𝑅2
) 
A higher synchronicity value indicates a stronger explanatory power of industry and market returns on firm 
returns. Conversely, lower synchronicity value reflects lower stock co-movements with industry and 
market, revealing a higher firm-specific information content of stock returns. 
3.4. Sample Selection 
We begin our data collection process by identifying firms included in the Bloomberg ESG coverage index 
from 2007 to 2014, which encompasses 9,064 firms. The Bloomberg ESG coverage index includes large 
and liquid stocks of interest to institutional investors and represents more than 90% of the total global 
market capitalization of all equity stocks. Table 1 shows how we arrive at our final sample of firm-year 
observations. 1,662 firms drop due to missing sustainability disclosure information. As SASB standards are 
tailored toward companies traded on U.S. exchanges, we exclude non-US listed firms, reducing our sample 
to 2,365 unique US firms. Following prior literature in synchronicity, we remove financial institutions and 
utility companies from our sample, leaving us with 1,802 firms.10 We collect financial information for the 
remaining firms from Bloomberg. 469 firms are missing all required financial information and information 
such as insider trading, leaving us with a final sample of 1,333 unique US companies. This translates into 
10,664 firm-year observations over our time period of eight years. Required financial information for 257 
firm-year observations is missing, resulting in our final sample comprising 10,407 observations. This 
sample represents about 56% of the market capitalization value of US firms and more than 80% of the 
market capitalization of US firms, excluding financial institutions and utilities, in Bloomberg’s ESG 
coverage index. 
                                                          
10 We note that stock returns of financial institutions in our period of study are heavily influenced by the financial 
crisis. 
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Table 2 presents the frequency distributions of observations in our sample. In Panel A, we provide 
an overview of the distribution across years. All years have an approximately equal number of observations. 
In Panel B, we show the distribution across industries. Industry is defined according to SASB’s Sustainable 
Industry Classification System (SICS), which categorizes companies not only based on their sources of 
revenue, as typically is the case, but also considers intangibles such as shared resource intensity, and 
sustainability risks and opportunities.11 Our sample covers 62 industries in 8 major SICS sectors: Health 
Care, Technology & Communications, Non-renewable Resources, Transportation, Services, Resource 
Transformation, Consumption, and Renewable Resources & Alternative Energy. The table reveals that our 
sample is not heavily tilted toward any specific industry, with the most frequently represented industry 
being “Industrial Machinery & Goods”, comprising 7% of the sample.  
4. RESULTS 
4.1. Summary Statistics 
Table 3, Panel A shows the summary statistics for the variables we employ in this study. Our synchronicity 
measure has a mean of -0.52 and standard deviation of 1.15, comparable to Piotroski and Roulstone (2004). 
A negative average synchronicity measure is representative of the existing literature and reveals that on 
average firm-specific variation accounts for more than half of the variation in stock returns. We find that 
material sustainability disclosure according to SASB standards (MaterialDisc) is on average 17.2% with a 
standard deviation of similar magnitude, indicating considerable variation in disclosure scores in our data. 
Following the literature, we account for potential correlated omitted factors with an array of control 
variables. Firm size is measured as the natural logarithm of market value of equity (MarketCap). GRI 
compliance is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm is following GRI reporting guidelines; it is 
zero otherwise (GRICompl). In our sample, approximately 8.3% of firms are GRI compliant. In a similar 
                                                          
11 See www.sasb.org/sics  
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manner, we report that 18.3% of our sample provides a separate sustainability report (SustReport).12 We 
find that on average 76.8% of the shares are held by institutional investors (InstOwn) within our sample. 
Further, we account for analyst forecast revisions measured as the natural logarithm of number of forecast 
revisions (AnalystRev). Our measure is very similar to Piotroski and Roulstone (2004), who advocate the 
consideration of analyst revisions as relevant factors to the information environment and in particular 
synchronicity. Additionally, we use the price to book ratio (MTB), standard deviation of return on assets 
(StdDevROA), and insider trading (InsiderTrades), measured as the natural logarithm of the absolute value 
of net trading by insiders scaled by annual trading volume. Our summary statistics are all broadly in line 
with the existing literature, supporting the representativeness of our sample for the US market. Panel B 
shows the univariate pairwise correlations between our variables. The highest correlation at 0.64 is between 
the GRI compliance and sustainability report indicator variables. This is expected, as firms that are GRI 
compliant also issue a sustainability report. We note that correlations between our synchronicity measure 
and the control variables are consistent with prior literature (e.g. Piotroski and Roulstone 2004; Crawford 
et al. 2012; Peterson et al. 2015). 
4.2. Material Sustainability Information and Stock Price Synchronicity 
We examine the relevance of SASB accounting standards for sustainability disclosure using a multivariate 
regression model. We regress one-year ahead stock price synchronicity on material sustainability disclosure 
according to SASB standards and relevant control variables. The lag ensures that the sustainability 
information is disseminated in the market. Our regression model is set up as follows13: 
                                                          
12 Dhaliwal et al. (2011) use a sample of U.S. firms from 1993 to 2007 and document that 9.14% of their sample 
provides a separate sustainability report. Given our sample period of 2007 to 2014 and the significant increase in ESG 
interest during this period our percentage is higher.  
13 We note that within firm variation of MaterialDisc is low, and as such, we do not model intertemporal comparisons.  
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𝑆𝑦𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡+1
= 𝛼0 + 𝛽1 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑆𝐺 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛(𝑀𝑉𝐸𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽3 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑂𝑤𝑛 𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽4𝑙𝑛(𝑁𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽5 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6 𝑆𝐷(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡)  + 𝛽7𝑙𝑛(𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖,𝑡)
+ ∑ 𝛾𝑘
62
𝑘=1
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛿𝑙
8
𝑙=1
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
The results, presented in Table 4, reveal that material sustainability disclosure according to SASB standards 
is negatively associated with stock price synchronicity. Column (1) shows the baseline result. Material 
sustainability disclosure produces a statistically significant coefficient of -0.51. Economically, this result 
indicates that an increase in material ESG disclosure by one standard deviation, i.e. 0.18 units, translates 
into a decrease in synchronicity of 0.09, or approximately 8% of the standard deviation of synchronicity. 
To ensure that this result is driven by material ESG disclosures identified by the SASB standard setting 
process, and not by general sustainability disclosure, we control for GRI compliance in column (2) and the 
issuance of a sustainability report in column (3). GRI compliance signifies disclosure of broad, multi-
stakeholder focused sustainability information according to GRI guidelines. Similarly, in column (3) we 
control for the issuance of a sustainability report, to account for general sustainability reporting. We note 
that neither GRI compliance nor the sustainability reporting controls are significant and controlling for them 
does not alter the result. The results in Table 4 are consistent with the hypothesis that disclosure of 
sustainability information according to SASB standards is associated with stock prices reflecting more firm-
specific information.14 
4.3. Firm Sustainability Importance  
We expect the relation between material sustainability disclosure and stock price synchronicity to be 
moderated by the importance of sustainability issues. Firms for which sustainability matters more should 
                                                          
14 In untabulated results, we also control for industry concentration (log of a revenue-based Herfindahl index of 
industry-level concentration). Consistent with Fernandes and Ferreira (2008), the coefficient on industry concentration 
is negative but insignificant, and our main results remain unchanged. 
18 
 
experience a stronger association between sustainability disclosure and the firm-specific information 
content of the stock market. To capture firm sustainability importance, we employ two proxies. The first is 
a measure of a company’s exposure to sustainability issues, obtained from MSCI Intangible Value 
Assessment (IVA) product, which identifies key ESG-driven risk and opportunity exposures relevant to a 
firm. Firms receive an annually updated, firm-specific rating that allows for a direct comparison between 
firms on their exposure to ESG issues. The second proxy is collected from Asset4, Thomson Reuters’ 
principal product for sustainability information. It captures how well sustainability issues are integrated 
with financial issues as well as in a company’s procedures. More specifically, our measure reflects whether 
these issues are integrated in management discussions and reviewed in the annual report. We expect firms 
with greater exposure to and integration of sustainability issues will experience a stronger firm-specific 
information effect in returns as material disclosure of sustainability information increases.  
The results are provided in Table 5. In column (1) we include the interaction effect between a 
dummy variable equal to one if a firm has above-average sustainability exposure in year t, ESGExposure 
(mean=0.45, standard deviation=0.54), and material ESG disclosure, revealing a significant negative 
coefficient. Interpreting the coefficients in column (1), we find that material sustainability disclosure 
reduces stock price synchronicity by -0.40 more when the firm-exposure to ESG risks and opportunities 
according to MSCI IVA is above average. This is substantial and can explain 35% of one standard deviation 
of variation in synchronicity. Column (2) provides the result for the interaction with above-average 
integration of sustainability issues, Integrated (mean=0.55, standard deviation=0.36), also producing a 
negative significant coefficient. We find that firms that integrate financial and ESG issues in their business, 
experience a stronger negative effect of material sustainability disclosure on stock price synchronicity by a 
magnitude of -0.53; this is approximately 46% of a standard deviation in synchronicity. Finally, we include 
both interactions together as shown in column (3). Both effects are significant suggesting that the effects 
are more pronounced for firms that are more economically exposed to sustainability issues and for firms 
that have integrated sustainability issues more into their business.  
4.4. Capital Market Participants 
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We expect that capital market participants who are more adept at processing information will moderate a 
stronger effect of material sustainability disclosure on stock price synchronicity. Our first measure captures 
the level of institutional ownership. Institutional investors are expected to be more proficient in integrating 
material sustainability disclosure into stock prices compared to retail investors. Our second measure reflects 
the percentage shares of a firm that is held by socially responsible investment (SRI) funds. SRI funds have 
a history of integrating sustainability information in their investment decisions and consequently are 
expected to exhibit higher information-processing skills, particularly for information of this nature. 
The results are provided in Table 6. Column (1) shows the results using institutional ownership as 
the moderator. We find that an increase in institutional ownership by one standard deviation, or 0.25, 
decreases synchronicity by 37% of a standard deviation of synchronicity. In column (2), SRI fund 
ownership is used in the interaction and finally both moderators are considered jointly in column (3). For 
all specifications, we find a negative significant interaction effect. When including both measures of 
investor expertise together, we find that both institutional ownership as well as SRI ownership matter. Our 
results support our hypothesis that the relationship between material sustainability disclosure and stock 
price synchronicity is more negative when capital market participants are more proficient at processing 
sustainability information. 
Moreover, we examine the role of sell-side analysts in moderating the relationship between 
sustainability information and synchronicity. Past literature has studied the relation between sustainability 
disclosures and ratings, and analyst recommendations (Ioannou and Serafeim 2015) or forecasts (Dhaliwal 
et al. 2012). Past research has also examined the relation between synchronicity and analyst forecasting 
intensity (which we control for in all of our models), documenting a positive relationship between the two 
(Piotroski et al. 2004).  Consistent with our previous argument, we expect that analysts with lower 
information processing costs, due to lower portfolio complexity, will exhibit a stronger negative 
relationship between sustainability information and synchronicity. Following Clement (1999), and using 
data from I/B/E/S, we proxy for portfolio complexity using the number of stocks an analyst covers within 
a year. Analysts who cover a large number of different stocks may not be able to invest the same amount 
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of research into any individual stock as compared to analysts who cover few stocks. To construct a firm-
year measure of information processing costs, NumberCompanies (mean=16.47, standard deviation=3.31), 
we average the number of stocks across all analysts covering a firm in a given year. In the first column of 
Table 7, the positive coefficient on MaterialDisc × NumberCompanies confirms that the relationship 
between sustainability information and synchronicity is less negative for firms with higher analyst portfolio 
complexity, suggesting that analysts are important intermediaries of sustainability information.  
The second column of Table 7 examines the role of firm-specific analyst experience, 
FirmExperience (mean=4.14, standard deviation=1.78). We proxy for analyst experience using the number 
of years an analyst has covered a specific stock, calculated using data from I/B/E/S. To construct a firm-
year measure, we average the number of years of experience across all analysts covering a particular firm 
in a given year. On the one hand, we expect firms covered by more experienced analysts to exhibit a stronger 
negative relation between synchronicity and sustainability information, as more experienced analysts may 
be better able to process and translate the sustainability information for investors. On the other hand, we 
expect to document the opposite effect if more experienced analysts exhibit inertia and are less likely to use 
new sources of information. Past research documents that more experienced analysts are faster in switching 
from an agency to a stakeholder logic of sustainability efforts (Ioannou and Serafeim 2015), and as such, 
the inertia argument may be less likely to apply in our setting. However, one could still expect that 
experience positively moderates the negative relation between sustainability disclosure and synchronicity, 
if lack of experience and disclosure are complements. In other words, if less experienced analysts require 
more disclosure in order to incorporate sustainability information into their analysis, then greater levels of 
experience will positively moderate the association between disclosure and synchronicity. We find evidence 
in favor of this latter argument, as confirmed by the positive coefficient on MaterialDisc × FirmExperience, 
suggesting that firms with more experienced analysts have a less negative relation between sustainability 
information and synchronicity. Finally, column three includes the two moderating variables together and 
shows that they are both significant.  
4.5. Intra-industry Information Transfers 
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An important stream of literature documents intra-industry information transfers whereby an idiosyncratic 
event that affects the short-window stock price of one firm (e.g., an earnings announcement by one firm, or 
an accounting restatement by one firm) also affects the contemporaneous short-window stock price of 
another firm in the same industry (Foster 1981; Gleason et al. 2008). Similarly, recent research documents 
cross-firm stock return predictability as a function of firm characteristics, specifically accounting quality, 
rather than to an information event (Chen et al. 2017). In this paper we investigate if intra-industry 
information transfers happen in the context of sustainability information. If information transfers exist, we 
expect that stock returns of firms that disclose little information about their material sustainability issues 
might exhibit higher co-movement with industry returns, if they belong to an industry where companies’ 
disclosure levels are high. In contrast, we expect no effect on co-movement with industry returns for firms 
that disclose little information but belong to industries where companies’ disclosure levels are low. We 
measure a firm’s industry level information in stock returns following Piotroski and Roulstone (2004) as 
the difference between the explanatory power of market and industry returns versus only market returns. 
The higher the difference, the more a firm’s stock returns contain industry-level information. 
 Table 8 present the results for this analysis. We find strong evidence that firms with low disclosure 
levels exhibit high industry-level synchronicity within the whole sample and that this result is driven only 
by firms in industries with rich information environment (i.e. industries having above average industry-
level sustainability disclosure scores). In untabulated results, we document that intra-industry information 
transfers are stronger for firms with greater exposure to sustainability issues and with a higher percentage 
of shares held by institutional investors.  
4.6. Additional Analyses 
4.6.1. Other Sustainability Disclosures 
In testing for the relation between material sustainability disclosures and synchronicity we have controlled 
for both compliance with GRI standards and whether a firm issues a sustainability report. However, firms 
disclose a wealth of sustainability information through other mediums, primarily their websites, even if 
they do not issue a separate report. We attempt to understand whether a firm’s sustainability disclosures not 
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included in SASB standards also have a negative association with synchronicity. Therefore, we construct a 
measure of ESG disclosure that is comprised of the total ESG disclosure score that Bloomberg calculates 
after orthogonalizing this measure with our materiality disclosure score.15 Effectively, this score captures a 
firm’s level of ESG disclosure that is unrelated to its level of material sustainability disclosure. In Table 9 
we find that this measure exhibits an insignificant association with synchronicity. In untabulated tests, we 
do not find that the measure is correlated with synchronicity in any of our moderating variable tests.   
4.6.2. Earnings Quality 
Firms that disclose more material sustainability information could also have different financial accounting 
characteristics, importantly earnings quality. Although not assessing disclosures, Kim, Park and Weir 
(2012) find that firms with good performance ratings on sustainability issues have higher earnings quality. 
Thus, earnings quality could be a correlated omitted variable if material sustainability disclosure is related 
to earnings quality. Prior literature is inconclusive on the relation between earnings quality and 
synchronicity. Durnev et al. (2003), Ferreira and Laux (2007) and Hutton et al. (2009) document that poor 
earnings quality is associated with lower firm-specific return variation, while Fernandes and Ferreira (2008) 
and Gul, Ng and Srinidhi (2001) find no relation between earnings quality and synchronicity. We follow 
Dechow and Dichev (2002), using the residuals from estimating a model of working capital accruals on 
lagged, current and future cash flows to estimate poor earnings quality (Poor_AQ). As another proxy for 
earnings quality, we compute the absolute value of firm accruals scaled by the absolute value of cash flow 
from operations (ABS_ACCR). In univariate correlations, we find a negative and significant (-0.0929, 
p<0.000) relationship between material ESG disclosure and ABS_ACCR, and a negative but insignificant 
relation with Poor_AQ (-0.0461, p<0.183). All of our aforementioned results are robust to controlling for 
Poor_AQ and ABS_ACCR. 
4.6.3. Validity of Synchronicity Measure 
                                                          
15 The Bloomberg disclosure score is calculated taking into account all ESG data items in the Bloomberg database. 
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Li et al. (2014) suggest that lower synchronicity could be a proxy for firm-specific information or noise in 
stock prices. Motivated by the fact that examining stock price synchronicity and idiosyncratic volatility 
sometimes produce different inferences, they suggest that researchers should understand if their results are 
robust when controlling for betas, and testing if the hypothesized relation between the independent variable 
of interest and synchronicity changes sign or remains the same. This is because a decrease in synchronicity 
could be driven by a decrease in beta and/or an increase in idiosyncratic volatility. If it changes sign, then 
this would be inconsistent with the proposed theory, as it would provide evidence that the relation between 
the independent variable of interest and idiosyncratic volatility is opposite to what is being predicted.  
In Table 10 we control for the market and industry betas in our regression model. We find that even 
when we control for market beta in columns (1) and (2), the relationship between material sustainability 
disclosure and synchronicity is negative and significant suggesting that firms with higher material 
sustainability disclosure have higher idiosyncratic volatility. In columns (3) and (4) we control for industry 
beta, and finally in columns (5) and (6) we control for both market and industry beta together. Across all 
specifications, the coefficient on sustainability disclosure remains negative and significant.  
5. CONCLUSION 
Our paper seeks to provide evidence on the characteristics of emerging accounting standards for 
sustainability information. Given that a large number of institutional investors seek sustainability data and 
have committed to use sustainability data, it is becoming increasingly important to develop a robust 
accounting infrastructure for the reporting of such information. In this paper, we test whether companies 
that voluntarily disclosed information, before the standards identified this information as investor-relevant, 
had lower stock price synchronicity.  
We find strong evidence that this is the case. Perhaps more importantly, we find that this association 
is moderated in predictable ways. The association is stronger for firms that are more exposed to 
sustainability issues and for firms that have integrated sustainability issues more into their business 
operations and strategy. We also find that the association is stronger when investors with higher 
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sustainability information processing capabilities hold the shares of the firm. These results not only increase 
our confidence that sustainability information rather than a correlated omitted variable drive the association, 
but also shed incremental light on firm and capital market characteristics that accentuate the relation. 
Furthermore, we document intra-industry information transfers, measured as increases in industry-level 
stock price synchronicity, for firms that have low transparency but are in industries with relatively high 
levels of sustainability disclosure. We also document that analyst characteristics (i.e. portfolio complexity 
and firm-specific experience) moderate the relation between sustainability information and synchronicity, 
adding new insights to the studies that examine analysts and sustainability information (Ioannou and 
Serafeim 2015 and Dhaliwal et al. 2012) as well as analyst activities and synchronicity (Piotroski et al. 
2004).  
Our paper is a first attempt to understand development of accounting standards for disclosure of 
sustainability information. Although SASB standards are still new, preventing researchers from 
documenting robust consequences from these standards, there will be exciting opportunities for research in 
the future. First, there is a need for field research that examines how companies react and use the standards 
in managing and reporting performance on different sustainability issues. Which companies adopt the 
standards first and why? What drives diffusion of standards across companies? Second, there is a need for 
empirical work that examines the consequences that standards have on the comparability of reported 
information. Do disclosures converge within an industry and diverge across industries? Third and perhaps 
most importantly, how do standards drive change inside organizations? Do they elevate the importance of 
sustainability issues inside organizations by assigning responsibility over sustainability issues at the board 
level, or using these metrics in executive compensation plans (Eccles et al. 2014)? These and other questions 
represent fruitful avenues for future research.  
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Appendix A: Variable definitions 
              
Synchronicity i,t Firm i’s stock price synchronicity in year t, measured as 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑅2
1−𝑅2
) from the 
annual firm-specific regression of daily firm returns on value-weighted market and 
industry returns. 
MaterialDisc i,t Ratio of the number of disclosed SASB ESG metrics to the total number of SASB 
ESG metrics available in Bloomberg, for firm i in year t.  
MarketCap i,t The natural logarithm of market capitalization for firm i in year t, from Compustat.  
GRICompl i,t A Bloomberg variable equal to 1 if firm i is compliant with GRI guidelines in year 
t, 0 otherwise. 
SustReport i,t A variable equal to 1 if firm i issues a sustainability report in year t, 0 otherwise. 
Computed using data from Thomson Reuters Asset4, CorporateRegister and 
Bloomberg. 
InstOwn i,t The percentage of firm i’s ownership by institutional shareholders in year t, from 
Thomson Reuters Ownership. 
AnalystRev i,t Natural logarithm of the number of analyst revisions for firm i in year t from 
I/B/E/S. 
MTB i,t Market to book value for firm i in year t, computed using data from Compustat. 
StdDevROA i,t Standard deviation of quarterly ROA, measured over the three years preceding and 
including t for firm i, computed using Compustat. 
InsiderTrades i,t Natural logarithm of the absolute value of net trading by insiders scaled by annual 
trading volume for firm i in year t, computed using CRSP.  
ESGExposure i,t A variable equal to 1 if firm i has above-median exposure to ESG-driven risks and 
opportunities in year t, as defined by MSCI IVA, 0 otherwise. 
Integrated i,t A variable equal to 1 if firm i has above-median integration of sustainability issues 
across its core business in year t, as defined by Thomson Reuters Asset4, 0 
otherwise. 
SRIOwn i,t  The percentage of firm i’s ownership by socially responsible investment funds in 
year t, calculated using Thomson Reuters Ownership data and Bloomberg. 
MarketBeta i,t Coefficient estimate of market returns from the regression of daily firm returns on  
value-weighted market and industry returns, for firm i in year t. 
IndustryBeta i,t  Coefficient estimate of industry returns from the regression of daily firm returns on  
value-weighted market and industry returns, for firm i in year t. 
R2Diff i,t The difference between the explanatory power from the annual firm-specific 
regression of daily firm returns on value-weighted market and industry returns and 
 the explanatory power from value-weighted market returns. 
LowDisclosure i,t An indicator variable taking the value of one for firms with below average 
MaterialDisc in year t.  
NumberCompanies i,t The average number of companies in analyst coverage across all analysts covering 
firm i in year t. 
FirmExperience i,t The average number of years an analyst follows firm i across all analysts covering 
firm i in year t. 
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Table 1  
Sample Selection  
    
 Unique firms 
Bloomberg ESG coverage             9,064  
Less: Missing ESG disclosure data  (1,662) 
Less: Non-US listed firms           (5,037) 
Less: Financial and utility companies              (563) 
Less: Missing required financial information              (469) 
Total number of unique firms in sample             1,333  
  
 Firm years 
Unique firms × number of years           10,664  
Less: Missing year-specific financial information              (257) 
Total number of firm-year observations in sample           10,407  
 
Table 2 
Frequencies 
      
Panel A. Year   
 
Year Frequency Percent 
2007 1,267 12.17 
2008 1,310 12.59 
2009 1,312 12.61 
2010 1,317 12.65 
2011 1,326 12.74 
2012 1,326 12.74 
2013 1,324 12.72 
2014 1,225 11.77 
Total 10,407 100 
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Panel B. Industry       
  Frequency Percent  Industry Frequency Percent 
       
Advertising & Marketing 48 0.46  Household Products 141 1.35 
Aerospace & Defense 230 2.21  Industrial Machinery & Goods 771 7.41 
Agricultural Products 80 0.77  Internet Media & Services 100 0.96 
Air Freight & Logistics 78 0.75  Iron & Steel Producers 111 1.07 
Airlines 62 0.60  Leisure Facilities 112 1.08 
Alcoholic Beverages 32 0.31  Managed Care 100 0.96 
Apparel & Accessories  431 4.14  Marine Transportation 48 0.46 
Appliance Manufacturing 39 0.37  Meat, Poultry & Dairy 52 0.50 
Auto Parts 132 1.27  Media Production   192 1.84 
Automobiles 68 0.65  Medical Equipment & Supplies 536 5.15 
Biofuels 23 0.22  Metals & Mining 119 1.14 
Biotechnology 302 2.90  Multiline Specialty Retailers  589 5.66 
Building Products  164 1.58  Non-Alcoholic Beverages 45 0.43 
Cable & Satellite 23 0.22  Oil & Gas Production 436 4.19 
Car Rental & Leasing 16 0.15  Oil & Gas-Midstream 56 0.54 
Casinos & Gaming 72 0.69  Oil & Gas-Refining  82 0.79 
Chemicals 375 3.60  Oil & Gas-Services 299 2.87 
Coal Operations 21 0.20  Pharmaceuticals 266 2.56 
Construction Materials 79 0.76  Processed Foods 149 1.43 
Containers & Packaging 135 1.30  Professional Services 436 4.19 
Cruise Lines 8 0.08  Pulp & Paper Products 30 0.29 
Drug Retailers 31 0.30  Rail Transportation 40 0.38 
E-Commerce 64 0.61  Restaurants 197 1.89 
Education 92 0.88  Road Transportation 94 0.90 
Electrical Equipment 270 2.59  Semiconductors 504 4.84 
Electronic Manufacturing  63 0.61  Software & IT Services 707 6.79 
Food Retailers & Distributors 86 0.83  Solar Energy 38 0.37 
Fuel Cells 31 0.30  Telecommunications 218 2.09 
Hardware 460 4.42  Tobacco 46 0.44 
Health Care Delivery 235 2.26  Toys & Sporting Goods 39 0.37 
Health Care Distributors 72 0.69     
Hotels & Lodging 32 0.31  Total 10,407 100 
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This table presents descriptive statistics.  Panel A presents descriptive data.  Panel B presents Pearson correlations; bolded numbers represent 
significance at 5% level or higher.  All variables are winsorized at the 1- and 99-percent levels, and defined in Appendix A. 
Table 3      
Descriptive Statistics     
Panel A. Descriptive Data (N = 10,407)       
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Median Q3 
Synchronicity -0.523 1.150 -1.057 -0.444 0.138 
MaterialDisc 0.172 0.184 0.000 0.125 0.268 
MarketCap 21.160 1.736 19.926 20.973 22.253 
GRICompl 0.083 0.276 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SustReport 0.183 0.387 0.000 0.000 0.000 
InstOwn 0.768 0.250 0.658 0.830 0.936 
AnalystRev 0.873 1.025 0.000 0.693 1.609 
MTB 3.619 5.713 1.343 2.229 3.812 
StdDevROA 0.056 0.076 0.014 0.029 0.064 
InsiderTrades 0.112 0.280 0.004 0.023 0.095 
Panel B. Correlations (N = 10,407)               
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
(1) Synchronicity 1                 
(2) MaterialDisc 0.2636 1               
(3) MarketCap 0.5477 0.5979 1             
(4) GRICompl 0.1780 0.4510 0.4279 1           
(5) SustReport 0.2480 0.5457 0.5480 0.6351 1         
(6) InstOwn 0.3154 0.1194 0.3046 0.0181 0.0556 1       
(7) AnalystRev 0.2045 0.2100 0.3369 0.1479 0.1806 0.1533 1     
(8) MTB 0.0132 0.0273 0.0865 0.0291 0.0208 -0.0319 -0.0348 1   
(9) StdDevROA -0.2833 -0.1969 -0.3309 -0.0966 -0.1451 -0.2544 -0.0534 0.1148 1 
(10) InsiderTrades -0.0603 -0.0240 -0.0095 -0.0566 -0.0755 -0.0721 -0.0342 0.0424 -0.0646 
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This table presents results of multivariate analyses of stock return synchronicity regressed on material sustainability disclosure and other control 
variables. All variables are winsorized at the 1- and 99-percent levels, and defined in Appendix A. Regressions include year and industry fixed 
effects, with standard errors clustered by firm. 
  
Table 4       
Relation between Material Sustainability Information and Stock Price Synchronicity 
              
 (1) (2) (3)  
Dependent variable: 
Synchronicity 
Dependent variable: 
Synchronicity 
Dependent variable: 
Synchronicity 
Variable Coef.  t-stat Coef.  t-stat Coef.  t-stat 
MaterialDisc -0.5135 -4.47 -0.5048 -4.29 -0.4676 -3.90  
        
GRICompl   -0.0124 -0.24   
SustReport       -0.0452 -1.05 
MarketCap 0.3794 24.48 0.3798 24.35 0.3824 23.92 
InstOwn 0.5979 6.89 0.5968 6.87 0.5923 6.88 
AnalystRev -0.0067 -0.62 -0.0067 -0.62 -0.0067 -0.62 
MTB 0.0016 0.81 0.0016 0.81 0.0015 0.77 
StdDevROA -0.9769 -3.80 -0.9765 -3.80 -0.9711 -3.78 
InsiderTrades -0.1114 -2.24 -0.1119 -2.25 -0.1149 -2.32 
Intercept -8.6373 -25.09 -8.6478 -24.89 -8.7138 -24.30 
         
N 10,407 10,407 10,407 
Adjusted-R2 0.57 0.57 0.57 
Fixed effects Year, Industry  Year, Industry  Year, Industry  
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Table 5       
Firm Exposure Moderators      
              
  
High Exposure to 
Sustainability issues 
Integrated Financial 
and Sustainability 
issues 
Both moderators 
together 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable: 
Synchronicity 
Dependent variable: 
Synchronicity 
Dependent variable: 
Synchronicity 
Variable Coef.  t-stat Coef.  t-stat Coef.  t-stat 
MaterialDisc -0.1969 -1.07 -0.0967 -0.58 0.2730 1.25 
MaterialDisc × ESGExposure -0.4042 -2.09     -0.4703 -2.41 
MaterialDisc × Integrated   -0.5293 -3.59 -0.5963 -4.11 
Integrated   0.0210 0.37 0.0911 2.27 
ESGExposure 0.0864 2.14     0.0429 0.76 
SustReport -0.0334 -0.79 -0.0582 -1.35 -0.0450 -1.07 
MarketCap 0.3807 22.85 0.3800 23.12 0.3797 22.05 
InstOwn 0.5817 6.81 0.5912 6.85 0.5792 6.78 
AnalystRev -0.0064 -0.59 -0.0067 -0.62 -0.0060 -0.56 
MTB 0.0017 0.86 0.0013 0.70 0.0015 0.81 
StdDevROA -0.9718 -3.83 -0.9853 -3.83 -0.9850 -3.88 
InsiderTrades -0.1185 -2.4 -0.1159 -2.34 -0.1205 -2.44 
Intercept -8.7447 -23.31 -8.6459 -22.29 -8.7355 -21.40 
         
N 10,407 10,407 10,407 
Adjusted-R2 0.568 0.570 0.570 
Fixed effects Year, Industry  Year, Industry  Year, Industry  
        
This table presents results of multivariate analyses of stock return synchronicity regressed on material sustainability disclosure interacted with 
firm-level variables of exposure to ESG issues, and other control variables. All variables are winsorized at the 1- and 99-percent levels, and 
defined in Appendix A. Regressions include year and industry fixed effects, with standard errors clustered by firm. 
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Table 6       
Capital Market Participant Moderators     
              
  Institutional Ownership 
Socially Responsible 
Investment Fund 
Ownership 
Both moderators 
together 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable: 
Synchronicity 
Dependent variable: 
Synchronicity 
Dependent variable: 
Synchronicity 
Variable Coef.  t-stat Coef.  t-stat Coef.  t-stat 
MaterialDisc 0.8222 1.86 -0.4625 -3.84 0.8183 1.85 
MaterialDisc × InstOwn -1.6568 -3.10     -1.6468 -3.08 
MaterialDiscl × SRIOwn   -1.8079 -2.31 -1.4390 -1.84 
SRIOwn   0.0518 2.57 0.0485 2.34 
SustReport -0.0385 -0.90 -0.0447 -1.04 -0.0381 -0.89 
MarketCap 0.3785 24.02 0.3819 23.87 0.3780 23.96 
InstOwn 0.7978 7.37 0.5858 6.81 0.7904 7.30 
AnalystRev -0.0068 -0.64 -0.0071 -0.66 -0.0072 -0.68 
MTB 0.0016 0.78 0.0015 0.76 0.0016 0.77 
StdDevROA -0.9088 -3.58 -0.9668 -3.77 -0.9047 -3.56 
InsiderTrades -0.1198 -2.37 -0.1142 -2.31 -0.1191 -2.36 
Intercept -8.7449 -24.75 -8.7035 -24.28 -8.7359 -24.72 
         
N 10,407 10,407 10,407 
Adjusted-R2 0.571 0.568 0.571 
Fixed effects Year, Industry  Year, Industry  Year, Industry  
              
This table presents results of multivariate analyses of stock return synchronicity regressed on material sustainability disclosure interacted with 
firm-level variables of institutional ownership and SRI fund ownership, and other control variables. All variables are winsorized at the 1- and 99-
percent levels, and defined in Appendix A. Regressions include year and industry fixed effects, with standard errors clustered by firm. 
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This table presents results of multivariate analyses of stock return synchronicity regressed on material ESG disclosure interacted with firm-level 
variables of analyst coverage characteristics, and other control variables. All variables are winsorized at the 1- and 99-percent levels, and defined 
in Appendix A. Regressions include year and industry fixed effects, with standard errors clustered by firm.  
 
       
Table 7 
Sell-side Analyst Moderators       
              
  
Analyst Portfolio 
Complexity Analyst Experience Both moderators together 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable: 
Synchronicity 
Dependent variable: 
Synchronicity 
Dependent variable: 
Synchronicity 
Variable Coef.  t-stat Coef.  t-stat Coef.  t-stat 
MaterialDisc -1.2587 -3.20 -0.8844 -3.60 -1.4702 -3.60 
MaterialDisc × NumberCompanies 0.0545 2.50     0.0399 1.80 
MaterialDiscl × FirmExperience   0.1075 2.54 0.0931 2.13 
NumberCompanies -0.0043 -0.77     -0.0055 -0.99 
FirmExperience   0.0149 1.62 0.0171 1.86 
SustReport -0.0255 -0.62 -0.0453 -1.11 -0.0457 -1.12 
MarketCap 0.3592 24.14 0.3522 23.66 0.3524 23.62 
InstOwn 0.3640 4.75 0.3661 4.85 0.3628 4.79 
AnalystRev -0.0220 -2.16 -0.0182 -1.78 -0.0185 -1.82 
MTB 0.0019 0.98 0.0020 1.00 0.0021 1.07 
StdDevROA -0.6026 -2.67 -0.5867 -2.65 -0.5768 -2.56 
InsiderTrades -0.1431 -2.62 -0.1209 -2.29 -0.1200 -2.27 
Intercept -7.9979 -26.07 -7.9771 -25.17 -7.8903 -25.90 
         
N 9,371 9,371 9,371 
Adjusted-R2 0.582 0.585 0.585 
Fixed effects Year, Industry  Year, Industry  Year, Industry  
              
 
 
 
36 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This table presents results of R2Diff regressed on our variables of interest. R2Diff equals the incremental explanatory power of industry-level returns 
over market returns to explain variation in firm-level returns. We regress R2Diff on LowDisclosure, defined in Appendix A. We do this for the full 
sample in column 1, for the sample of firms that have a Rich Information Environment in column 2 (i.e. firms belonging to industries in which 
material ESG disclosure is above average) and for the sample of firms that have a Poor Information Environment in column 3 (i.e. firms in industries 
having below average material ESG disclosure). Below the Rich/Poor Information Environment specifications, we report the statistical significance 
of the differences in coefficient estimates for our variables of interest, based on a system of seemingly unrelated regressions that jointly estimates 
Table 8       
Incremental Explanatory Power of Industry-level Returns  
              
Low Disclosure Firms   
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Full Sample 
Rich Information 
Environment 
Poor Information 
Environment 
Variable Coef.  t-stat Coef.  t-stat Coef.  t-stat 
LowDisclosure 0.0153 2.83 0.0316 4.32 -0.0081 -1.06 
SustReport 0.0070 0.99 0.0124 1.32 -0.0026 -0.25 
MarketCap 0.0615 30.91 0.064 22.67 0.0578 23.06 
InstOwn 0.0530 5.00 0.063 3.91 0.0398 3.15 
AnalystRev -0.0006 -0.30 0.0012 0.43 -0.0034 -1.44 
MTB -0.0002 -0.54 -0.0003 -0.46 -0.0002 -0.49 
StdDevROA -0.0916 -3.03 -0.1505 -2.55 -0.0708 -2.40 
InsiderTrades -0.0415 -6.82 -0.0491 -6.21 -0.0234 -3.08 
Intercept -1.0837 -23.77 -1.1332 -18.58 -1.0069 -17.2 
N 10,407 5,534 4,873 
Adjusted-R2 0.65 0.644 0.66 
Fixed effects Year, Industry  Year, Industry  Year, Industry  
         
Comparison of coefficients on LowDisclosure: Test for 
(2) > (3) Null hypothesis: (2) = (3)  
   P-value = 0.0002 
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the models and takes into account correlations in residuals across the regressions (Zellner 1962). This procedure uses a common sample for the two 
regressions and allows to explicitly test whether the coefficients on the various independent variables are different across the two models. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This table presents robustness results of stock return synchronicity regressed on both material sustainability disclosure and other (non-material) 
sustainability disclosure, and other control variables. All variables are winsorized at the 1- and 99-percent levels, and defined in Appendix A. 
Regressions include year and industry fixed effects, with standard errors clustered by firm. 
 
 
Table 9     
Other Sustainability Disclosure   
          
 (1) (2) 
 
Dependent variable: 
Synchronicity 
Dependent variable: 
Synchronicity 
Variable Coef.  t-stat Coef.  t-stat 
OtherSustDisc 0.0181 0.10 -0.0806 -0.44 
SustReport   -0.0372 -0.82 
MaterialDisc   -0.4846 -3.76 
     
MarketCap 0.3470 27.70 0.3832 23.36 
InstOwn 0.6268 7.05 0.5911 6.86 
AnalystRev -0.0090 -0.83 -0.0067 -0.62 
MTB 0.0017 0.84 0.0015 0.78 
StdDevROA -0.9980 -3.81 -0.9721 -3.79 
InsiderTrades -0.1005 -2.01 -0.1156 -2.33 
Intercept -8.1716 26.42 -8.7228 -24.06 
     
N 10,407 10,407 
Adjusted-R2 0.565 0.568 
Fixed effects Year, Industry  Year, Industry  
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This table presents robustness results of stock return synchronicity regressed on material sustainability disclosure and other control variables. We 
control for the market and industry betas in our regression model. All variables are winsorized at the 1- and 99-percent levels, and defined in 
Appendix A. Regressions include year and industry fixed effects, with standard errors clustered by firm. 
Table 10             
Synchronicity Measure Validity         
              
  (1) (2) (3) 
  
Dependent variable: 
Synchronicity 
Dependent variable: 
Synchronicity 
Dependent variable: 
Synchronicity 
Variable Coef.  t-stat Coef.  t-stat Coef.  t-stat 
MaterialDisc -0.6844 -5.56 -0.7067 -5.83 -0.5904 -4.93 
MarketBeta 0.3869 9.50     0.5490 11.11 
IndustryBeta     0.4261 10.45 0.6250 11.36 
              
SustReport -0.0822 -1.71 -0.0741 -1.66 -0.0632 -1.42 
MarketCap 0.4020 23.40 0.3486 21.58 0.3710 22.18 
InstOwn 0.5249 6.04 -0.0184 -1.6 -0.0242 -2.11 
AnalystRev -0.0057 -0.48 0.0019 0.83 0.0018 0.84 
MTB 0.0029 1.33 -1.0272 -3.67 -1.2059 -4.40 
StdDevROA -1.0546 -3.91 0.5171 5.97 0.5034 5.95 
InsiderTrades -0.2119 -4.00 -0.1953 -3.68 -0.1855 -3.59 
Intercept -9.5326 -23.48 -8.1254 -22.94 -9.0535 -23.15 
              
N 10,407 10,407 10,407 
Adjusted-R2 0.421 0.419 0.447 
Fixed effects Year, Industry  Year, Industry  Year, Industry  
